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Abstract
This paper estimates two optimization-based sticky-price New Keynesian
models and assesses how well they describe US output, inﬂation, and interest
rate dynamics. We consider models in which either internal habit formation or
external habit formation inﬂuence consumption behavior, and in which Calvo-
pricing and inﬂation indexation generate price and inﬂation inertia. Subject
to constraints dictated by household and ﬁrm behavior, monetary policy is set
under discretion and the model’s time-consistent equilibrium is employed to es-
timate key behavioral parameters. We ﬁnd that speciﬁcations estimated on
consumption data perform better than speciﬁcations estimated on output data
and that models with external habit formation out-perform models with inter-
nal habit formation. Nevertheless, even the best ﬁtting speciﬁcation displays
characteristics that are inconsistent with the data.
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The canonical sticky-price New Keynesian model (Goodfriend and King, 1997; Rotem-
berg and Woodford, 1997) forms the backbone to a large body of research into optimal
monetary policy (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999; Jensen, 2002; Walsh, 2003). The
model consists of just two equations, a forward-looking IS curve, capturing consump-
tion smoothing behavior, and a forward-looking Phillips curve, derived from optimal
price setting in the presence of nominal rigidities. An attractive feature of the
canonical model is that it is analytically tractable in many applications. However,
as an empirical description of macroeconomic dynamics, the model performs poorly.
Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) and Rudd and Whelan (2003) show that the canonical
New Keynesian Phillips curve leads to counterfactual price movements and that it
has very little explanatory power. Similarly, Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2002) ﬁnd that
the canonical New Keynesian IS curve — a critical component in the monetary pol-
icy transmission mechanism — provides a very poor description of output dynamics
and that it is convincingly rejected by US data.1 Moreover, it still remains to be
established whether estimated Taylor-type rules (Taylor, 1993), which are closely con-
nected to the New Keynesian framework, are the outcome of optimal policy behavior
(Dennis, 2001; Rudebusch, 2001).
When it comes to explaining observed economic outcomes, a critical shortcoming
with the canonical model is that it provides no mechanism for generating persistence.2
No capital accumulation takes place and both inﬂation and consumption/output are
jump variables. Because it contains no endogenous dynamics, without introducing
serially correlated shocks, the model cannot account for the persistence that is present
in inﬂation and output data. To counter these empirical weaknesses, much research
now focuses on models that generalize the canonical model to contain features such
as habit formation (McCallum and Nelson, 1999), wage and price stickiness (Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin, 2000), and price indexation (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans, 2001), features that are explicitly designed to generate persistence. However,
many studies that use generalized, or hybrid, New Keynesian models do not estimate
1In fact, depending on how monetary policy is modeled, the canonical new Keynesian IS/Phillips
curves may not even be estimable, i.e., the structural parameters in these equations may not be
identiﬁed (Dennis, 2003; Nason and Smith, 2003).
2See the model speciﬁcation laid out in Clarida, et al. (1999, section 2) for example.
1the model, but simply assign values to parameters (Erceg, et al., 2000; Amato and
Laubach, 2003). Thus, while hybrid models should have greater empirical content
than the canonical model, it is not clear that they explain observed macroeconomic
outcomes, leaving question marks hanging over the conclusions and policy prescrip-
tions drawn from them.
In this paper we formulate and estimate several optimization-based New Key-
nesian models with Calvo-pricing, price indexation, and habit formation, providing
estimates of the parameters that govern these important New Keynesian features. We
consider both internal habit formation, where households internalize the eﬀect their
past consumption has on the marginal utility of current consumption, and external
habit formation, where a household’s marginal utility of consumption is lowered when
others consume more. These models are standard generalizations on the canonical
New Keynesian model, and exhibit the lead/lag structures in output and inﬂation
that are typical of the speciﬁcations analyzed in the optimal monetary policy rules lit-
erature (see Clarida, et al., 1999, section 6). The models are estimated on US data,
using multiple measures of the output/consumption gap, inﬂation, and short-term
interest rates, and assessed against Vector AutoRegressions (VARs).
Rather than estimate the models using single-equation estimation methods — ig-
noring the cross-equation restrictions implied by the underlying theory — we estimate
the models as a system using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). Es-
timating the models as a system not only facilitates an eﬃciency gain, but it also
allows us to estimate parameters that cannot be identiﬁed with single-equation meth-
ods. To apply FIML some assumption must be made about how monetary policy
is formulated. While we could simply postulate and estimate an interest rate rule,
w ec h o o s ei n s t e a dt or e m a i nw i t h i na no p t i m i z a t i o n - b a s e df r a m e w o r ka n dt oa s s u m e
that the monetary authority is an optimizing agent that sets policy according to an
optimal discretionary rule. Consequently, we postulate an objective function for the
monetary authority,3 solve for the time-consistent policy rule, and estimate the pa-
rameters in the policy objective function alongside the structural parameters in the
optimization constraints.
3We use the standard quadratic that is widely used in the monetary policy rules literature (Bryant,
Hooper, and Mann, 1993; Taylor, 1999).
2T h em o d e l st h a tw ec o n s i d e rh a v ea s p e c t si nc o m m o nw i t ht h o s ed e r i v e di nC h r i s -
tiano, et al. (2001) and in Smets and Wouters (2002). Unlike those studies, how-
ever, we explicitly model the monetary policy formulation process, allowing monetary
policy to be set optimally rather than according to a simple instrument rule. An
important payoﬀ to modeling the central bank as an optimizing agent is that it allows
us to estimate the parameters in the policy objective function and to compare these
estimates to the values typically used in the optimal monetary policy rules literature.
Moreover, because we do not estimate the models on de-meaned data, we are able to
estimate the equilibrium real interest rate, the implicit inﬂation target, and to test
whether monetary policy created a discretionary inﬂation bias.
Several important results emerge from our analysis. First, while introducing
(internal or external) habit formation and price indexation leads to a statistically
signiﬁcant improvement in the models’ ability to ﬁt US data, the resulting speciﬁca-
tions are, nevertheless, still inconsistent with the data. Second, according to standard
information criteria, models with external habit formation describe US data better
than models with internal habit formation. Moreover, with external habit formation
the estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution that are obtained are
more in line with estimates found in other studies. However, the process by which
habits are formed diﬀers importantly depending on whether the model is estimated
on output data or on consumption data. These diﬀerences suggest that what is
perceived as habit formation may partially reﬂect other dynamic mechanisms, such
as capital accumulation, in speciﬁcations estimated on output data.
Third, for the Volcker-Greenspan period, we obtain plausible estimates of the
implicit inﬂation target and ﬁnd evidence for interest rate smoothing. However,
evidence for output stabilization is weak and we ﬁnd no evidence for a discretionary
inﬂation bias. Fourth, for both the internal habit formation model and the external
habit formation model, the estimates suggest that around 20 percent of ﬁrms re-
optimize their price each quarter. Finally, we ﬁnd that the New Keynesian optimal-
policy models perform better when estimated on consumption data than on output
data. This last result is notable because New Keynesian models are typically applied
or calibrated to output gap speciﬁcations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the following Section the
3models that are estimated are presented. Section 3 describes the data on which the
models are estimated and shows how each model’s time-consistent equilibrium can be
used to estimate its behavioral parameters. In Section 4 the models are estimated
and the results are interpreted and compared to other estimates in the literature.
Section 5 assesses the models to determine which speciﬁcation best conforms to the
data. The selected speciﬁcations are then compared to a VAR model to help identify
areas where the New Keynesian models are inconsistent with the data. Section 6
concludes.
2T h e M o d e l s
The models that we consider contain the central features of the New Keynesian
optimal-policy apparatus. We do not present the models’ derviations in complete
detail because numerous closely related expositions are available in the literature
(Smets and Wouters, 2002; Amato and Laubach, 2003).
2.1 Firms
Firms are monopolistically competitive. They maximize the expected discounted
value of future proﬁts, pricing along their demand curve to set prices as a ﬁxed mark-
up over marginal costs. Following Calvo (1983), each period a ﬁx e dp r o p o r t i o no f
ﬁrms, 1−ξp
¡
0 ≤ ξp ≤ 1
¢
, receive a signal to re-optimize their price while ﬁrms that
do not re-optimize index their price change to last period’s inﬂation rate (Christiano,
et al., 2001). The ﬁrst-order condition for optimal price-setting combined with
price indexation by non-optimizing ﬁrms, when log-linearized about the economy’s















In equation (1), c mct represents real marginal costs, which, because there is no capital
in production, simply equals the real wage divided by the marginal product of labor.
Any proﬁts that ﬁrms earn are returned to households (the shareholders) in the form
of a lump-sum dividend payment.
42.2 Households
Households are inﬁnitely lived and have identical preferences over consumption rel-
ative to habit consumption, real money balances, and leisure. They consume a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the goods that ﬁrms produce and they rent their labor
to ﬁrms in a perfectly competitive labor market. Households can transfer wealth
through time either by holding one-period bonds, which earn the nominal rate Rt,o r
by holding real money balances. The representative household’s expected lifetime











where Ct denotes ﬁnal goods consumption, Ht denotes habit consumption, Lt denotes
labor supply, Mt
Pt denotes real money balances, and β (0 <β<1) is the subjective
discount factor. The subjective discount factor that enters equation (1) is the same
as that entering the households’ utility function because future proﬁts are valued in
terms of the extra utility they provide to households.
Under the assumption that households have internal habit formation, Ht = C
γ
t−1





















According to equation (3), the marginal utility of consumption for a household is
declining in the quantity of goods consumed by that household last period. With
this speciﬁcation for utility, the household seeks to smooth both the level and the
growth rate of consumption through time and the desire to keep changes in con-
sumption small leads to inertia, or persistence, in consumption. The parameters,
σ,α, and θ (σ,α,θ > 0) regulate the curvature of the utility function with respect to
consumption, real money balances, and leisure, respectively, while γ (|γ| < 1) indexes
the degree of habit formation. When γ is positive habit formation is present; when
γ is negative consumption can be viewed as a durable good. Also entering the in-
stantaneous utility function is a consumption preference shock, gt, which is assumed
to be an iid,z e r om e a n ,ﬁnite variance, random variable.
5To model external habit formation, we assume that the household conditions on
Ht when making its consumption decision, that Ht evolves according to
Ht = γ1Ct−1 + γ2Ct−2, (4)
where |γ1 + γ2| < 1, and that the instantaneous utility function is given by
u(.,.,.,.)=














Under external habit formation, a household’s marginal utility of consumption is
declining in the level of past aggregate consumption, producing behavior in which
households try to “keep up with the Joneses.”
Regardless of whether the household has internal or external habit formation, the




















where Bt represents nominal bond holdings brought into period t and Πt is the lump-
sum dividend payment that households receive from ﬁrms.
The log-linearized ﬁrst-order conditions from the households optimization prob-
lem can be written as
Et∆b ct+1 =
γ (σ − 1)
[σ + γβ(σγ − 1 − γ)]
·
∆b ct + βEt∆b ct+2 +
1
γ (σ − 1)
Et(Rt − πt+1 +l n( β) − gt)
¸
(7)











(1 − γ1 − γ2)
σ(1 + γ1)
Et (Rt − πt+1 +l n( β) − gt)
(8)
for the external habit formation model. While the lead-lag structures for consump-
tion are considerably more complicated than those from the standard time-separable
utility formulation, the coeﬃcients on the consumption terms in equations (7) and
(8) sum to one. Thus, even with habit formation, an increase in permanent income
leads to a permanent increase in consumption.
To close the model we assume that real marginal costs are related to the “con-
sumption gap” according to b ct = c mct + ut. While clearly an approximation, this
6assumption yields a Phillips curve in inﬂa t i o n / g a ps p a c ea n di sa na s s u m p t i o nt h a t
is explicitly or implicitly made in most of the New Keynesian literature. The ad-
vantage of this simple relationship between the gap and real marginal costs is that
it simpliﬁes the estimation, allows the model estimates to be compared to those in
other studies, and bypasses the need to specify an explicit production technology.
At the same time, estimates that are based on a microfounded relationship between
the “consumption gap” and real marginal costs are of considerable interest; work
underway addresses this issue (Dennis, 2003).
The internal-habit-formation model and the external-habit-formation model de-
rived above represent two popular generalizations on the canonical New Keynesian
model. A large literature has developed that examines optimal monetary policy in
models closely related to these. A critical characteristic of these models is that they
abstract from investment and capital accumulation as well as from open economy
considerations.4 In some ways this abstraction is a convenience to simplify the mod-
els’ derivations. However, abstracting from capital accumulation also reﬂects the
focus of the New Keynesian optimal policy literature, which concentrates on shorter-
run macroeconomic stabilization issues and not on longer-run growth issues for which
supply-side considerations are thought to be more important (McCallum and Nelson,
1997). But, because the economy is closed and because there is no investment, the
economy’s resource constraint implies that for these models output dynamics and
consumption dynamics should be the same.
2.3 Central Bank
The central bank is the only other decision-making agent in the model. The central
bank is assumed to set the short-term nominal interest rate, Rt, subject to con-








2 + λ(b ct+j − c∗)




This policy objective function allows for an inﬂation stabilization objective, an
consumption gap stabilization objective, and an interest rate smoothing objective.
4See Galí and Monacelli (2000) for an extension of the canonical New Keynesian model to the
open economy.
7In the inﬂation stabilization term, π∗ represents the central bank’s implicit inﬂation
target. We assume that the central bank cannot precommit and that it sets monetary
policy under discretion. Consequently, we allow the parameter c∗ to enter the con-
sumption stabilization objective to examine whether policymakers face an incentive
to create a discretionary inﬂation bias.5 The two policy preference parameters, λ and
ν, the relative weights on consumption stabilization and on interest rate smoothing,
are required to be non-negative.
Equation (9) has not been derived from a second-order approximation to the
household’s utility function, although the analysis in Woodford (2002) suggests that
such an approximation would yield a similar speciﬁcation. If a second order approx-
imation to household utility were used, then the parameters λ,ν,a n dc∗ would be
functions of the model’s utility and technology parameters. When it comes to esti-
mating the model, we assume that monetary policy is set with discretion and allow
for the possibility that a Rogoﬀ (1985) optimally conservative central banker — who
has preferences that diﬀer from the representative household — has been appointed.
F o rt h i sr e a s o nw ea l l o wλ,ν, and c∗ to be freely estimated, subject to non-negativity
constraints on λ and ν.
3 Data and Model Estimation
3.1 Data
The models that we estimate consist of a forward-looking IS curve, either equation (7)
or equation (8), a hybrid Phillips curve, equation (1), and a loss function, equation
(9). To estimate the models we require data for b ct, πt,a n dRt. The economy’s
resource constraint posits that consumption and output are equal, so, in principle,
the model can be estimated on either consumption or output data. In what follows,
we use data on both variables and use several techniques to de-trend each series. The
d a t aa r es u m m a r i z e di nT a b l e1 .
5Of course, even if there is no discretionary inﬂation bias in the time-consistent equilibrium, the
model’s dynamic behavior will still be ineﬃcient due to a stabilization bias (Dennis and Söderström,
2002).
8Table 1: Data Deﬁnitions
b y1
t (log-) ratio of GDP to CBO measure of potential
b y2
t (log-) GDP de-trended using HP ﬁlter
b y3
t (log-) GDP/Labor Force de-trended using HP ﬁlter
b c1
t (log-) Consumption de-trended using HP ﬁlter
b c2
t (log-) Consumption/Labor Force de-trended using HP ﬁlter
π
y
t Annualized quarterly percent change in GDP price index
πc
t Annualized quarterly percent change in core-PCE price index
R
f
t Nominal federal funds rate
RT
t Nominal 3-month T-Bill rate
We use ﬁve gap measures: three output gaps and two consumption gaps. The
ﬁrst output gap, b y1
t, in which real GDP is de-trended using the Congressional Bud-
get Oﬃce (CBO) measure of potential output, is the same as that Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999) use to study optimal simple policy rules. Using this measure of the
output gap provides a bridge between our results and the results that emerge from
studies that employ the Rudebusch-Svensson framework. We also construct an out-
put gap, b y2
t, and a consumption gap, b c1
t, by de-trending using the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter. However, to be consistent with the representative-agent characterization of
the households’ optimization problem, the remaining two gap measures, b y3
t and b c2
t,
are constructed from per-labor-force measures of output and consumption. We de-
trend (log-) output-per-labor-force and (log-) consumption-per-labor-force using the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
The three output gap measures and the two consumption gap measures are dis-
played in Figure 1A and Figure 1B, respectively, for the period 1956.Q1 — 2002.Q2.
Looking at Figure 1A, by-and-large, the three output gap variables move in sym-
pathy; the recessions in the early 1980s and in the early 1990s are clearly evident.
However, when the output gap is constructed using the CBO measure of potential
output, b y1
t, the resulting output gap is noticeably more volatile than the other two
measures. Moreover, while the correlation between b y2
t and b y3
t is 0.97, the correlation
between b y1
t and either b y2
t or b y3
t is only about 0.77. Turning to Figure 1B, in terms of
the timing and amplitude of the business cycle, the two consumption gap variables
tell a similar story to the three output gap variables. Although b c2
t is slightly more
volatile than b c1
t, their correlation is 0.95. These output gap and consumption gap
variables illustrate the relative stability the US economy has experienced following
9Figure 1: Post WWII Data
101984 (or so) relative to the 1960s and 1970s. As discussed earlier, this decline in
volatility may be due to a decline in the variance of demand shocks.
Two measures of inﬂation, πt, are used. When the model is estimated on one
of the three output gap variables inﬂation is measured as the annualized quarterly
percent change in the GDP price index, and is denoted π
y
t. In contrast, when one
of the two consumption gap variables is used for estimation, inﬂation is measured as
the annualized quarterly percent change in the core-PCE price index, and is denoted
πc
t.T h e t w o i n ﬂation variables are shown in Figure 1C. The most prominent
feature of Figure 1C is the rapid rise in inﬂation that occurred in the 1970s following
the oil price shocks, and the subsequent drop in inﬂation that occurred in the 1980s,
associated with the Volcker-recession. The standard deviation of GDP price inﬂation
is 2.43 percent while that for core-PCE price inﬂation is 2.52 percent; the correlation
between the two inﬂation variables is 0.93.
The inﬂation data and the consumption gap and output gap data are both mea-
sured at the quarterly frequency. Because quarterly data are used, it is natural to
take one quarter to be the length of a period in the theoretical model. For this rea-
son, the one-period bond that enters the model can be thought of as an asset such as
a 3-month T-bill. However, when modeling the central bank’s optimization problem
we assume that the interest rate on the one-period bond is the central bank’s policy
instrument, which makes it natural to associate Rt with the federal funds rate. When
estimating the models, then, we will use both the quarterly average federal funds rate
and the quarterly average yield on 3-month T-bills to represent Rt.A s c a n b e s e e n
in Figure 1D, the main diﬀerence between these two interest rate series is their level.
The 3-month T-bill rate typically lies below the federal funds rate, particularly at
times when inﬂation is high. It is notable that short-term nominal interest rates
rose rapidly when inﬂation climbed in the late-1970s, but rose less rapidly when in-
ﬂation began to pickup in 1973. This relationship between inﬂation and short term
nominal interest rates has led to the view that monetary policy accommodated rising
inﬂation in the early- to mid-1970, when Arthur Burns was FOMC chairman, but
“lent-against-the-wind” in the late-1970s, when Paul Volcker became FOMC chair-
man. The standard derivations of the federal funds rate and of the 3-month T-bill
rate are 3.25 percent and 2.67 percent, respectively; their correlation is 0.99.
113.2 Model Estimation
To estimate the model it must ﬁrst be transformed into a suitable form. Speciﬁ-
cally, we need to solve for the time-consistent solution to the optimal policy problem
and manipulate the resulting equilibrium relationships to remove variables that are
endogenous, but not stochastic endogenous. The goal is to arrive at a speciﬁcation
that contains only stochastic endogenous variables (so that the system has a full set









t (ns × 1) contains stochastic endogenous variables and
zi
t (ni × 1) contains endogenous variables deﬁned by identities. The optimization
constraints can be written as
A0zt = a + A1zt−1 + A2Etzt+1 + A3xt + ut. (10)
The solution to the central bank’s optimization problem yields a time-consistent
































for which the optimal discretionary rule can be written as




Assume that H2a has full rank. Let G be an ns × ns matrix determined as the
solution to F2a−GH2a = 0. By adding and subtracting Gzs
t from equation (12), the
shocks, us
t, can be eliminated, allowing the optimal discretionary rule to be expressed
as
xt =( f − Ghs)+( F1a − GH1a)zs
t−1 +( F1b − GH1b)zi
t−1 + Gzs
t. (13)
We now introduce an ns×1 disturbance vector, vt,t ot h ep o l i c yr u l et op r e v e n ta
stochastic singularity from arising during estimation. This disturbance term repre-
sents measurement error and is motivated on the realistic and standard assumption
that the econometrician estimating the system possesses less information than the
policymaker (Hansen and Sargent, 1980).
Using the fact that the time-consistent equilibrium takes the form zt = h +
H1zt−1 + H2ut, the optimization constraints can be expressed as
(A0 − A2H1)zt =( a + A2h)+A1zt−1 + A3xt + ut. (14)
12Partitioning zt as earlier and deﬁning B0≡ A0 − A2H,b ≡ a + A2h,B1 ≡ A1,a n d






















































































We now substitute zi
t from the system so that the equations for zs
t and xt depend












































Equation (17) can be written as
C0yt = c + C1yt−1 + C2zi













,a n dt h ed e ﬁnitions of C0,c,C1,a n dC2 are straight-
forward. The model is now in a form to which likelihood-based estimation methods
can be applied.
4 Model Estimates
In this section we present estimates of the internal-habit-formation and the external-
habit-formation models derived in Section 2. For the internal-habit-formation model,
the central bank’s optimization problem is constrained by equations (1), (7), and (9),
and the parameters to be estimated are Γ = {β,ξp,σ,γ,π∗,λ,ν,c ∗}.W h e n t h e
habit formation is external, equation (8) replaces equations (7), and we estimate
13Γ = {β,ξp,σ,γ1,γ2,π∗,λ,ν,c ∗}. These two New Keynesian optimal-policy models
are estimated on the data discussed in Section 3 over the period 1982.Q1 — 2002.Q2,
a period we term the Volcker-Greenspan period for convenience.6 Estimates for
this period are of broad interest because inﬂation declined dramatically during this
period, and it is important to examine how this disinﬂa t i o ni sa c c o u n t e df o rw i t h i n
an optimization-based environment. Moreover, simple policy rules estimated over
this sample indicate that a systematic and stable approach to monetary policy was
pursued, which suggests that monetary policy was not obviously inconsistent with
optimal behavior.
4.1 Estimates with Internal Habit Formation
With internal habit formation households internalize the eﬀe c tt h a tc o n s u m p t i o n
today has on the marginal utility of consumption in subsequent periods. Utility
maximization yields a consumption Euler equation in which current consumption
is aﬀected not only by consumption last period, but also by expected consumption
one- and two-periods ahead. The weights on these three consumption terms are
determined by σ, the curvature of the utility function with respect to consumption,
and by γ, the internal-habit-formation parameter.
The estimation results for the ﬁve gap variables are presented in Table 2; Panel
A presents results for speciﬁcations in which the federal funds rate enters the model;
Panel B presents estimates based on the 3-month T-bill rate.7
6Volcker’s tenue actually began in 1979.Q3. However, the sample begins in 1982.Q1 to exclude
the period of non-borrowed reserves targeting that occurred early in Volcker’s tenure.
7Where theory dictates that a parameter should be non-negative, the signiﬁcance levels reported
are for one-sided hypothesis tests.
14Table 2: Model Estimates for the Volcker-Greenspan Period







ρ 2.61‡ 2.67†† 2.81†† 2.43†† 2.49††
γ 1.00†† 1.00†† 1.01†† 0.93‡ 0.89††
10 × 1
σ 0.03† 0.03† 0.04† 0.01 0.01
ξp 0.92†† 0.86†† 0.83†† 0.82†† 0.78††
π∗ 2.30‡ 2.31†† 2.37†† 2.70‡ 2.72††
c∗ 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04
λ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ν 1.21‡ 1.48‡ 0.99‡ 2.76† 2.06†







ρ 2.10† 2.27†† 2.41†† 2.04†† 2.12††
γ 1.00†† 1.00†† 1.01†† 0.91†† 0.88††
10 × 1
σ 0.02† 0.03† 0.04† 0.01 0.01
ξp 0.92†† 0.87†† 0.84†† 0.83†† 0.79††
π∗ 2.23‡ 2.27†† 2.34†† 2.69‡ 2.71††
c∗ 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04
λ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ν 1.72‡ 2.14‡ 1.42‡ 4.05† 2.83†
†† indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level
‡ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level
† indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level
Looking ﬁrst at the results in Panel A, the estimates of the rate of time preference,
ρ (ρ =- ln(β)), which is the same as the equilibrium, or steady-state, real interest rate
in this model, range between 2.43 and 2.81, implying estimates of β that are between
0.993 and 0.994.T h e s e e s t i m a t e s o f β are consistent with conventional values in
quarterly models. In theory, the habit-formation parameter, γ, should be less than
one. Perhaps surprisingly, the estimates of γ in Table 2 that are based on output
data are all slightly greater than one, but in no case are they signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one. More importantly, in each case, γ is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
providing evidence for the view that the standard time-separable utility function
cannot adequately describe consumption/output dynamics. For the speciﬁcations
estimated on consumption data γ is estimated to be about 0.90. Other estimates of
habit formation, such as those in Fuhrer (2000, Table 1), γ =0 .80,0.90, also impart
signiﬁcant inertia in consumption, while coming from a slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcation
for habit formation.
15The parameter 1
σ, which relates to the curvature of the utility function with re-
spect to consumption, is found to be very small numerically, although statistically
signiﬁcant for the output-based estimations. Such small values for 1
σ suggest that
households are relatively unwilling to substitute consumptiuon through time. Camp-
bell and Mankiw (1989) estimate 1
σ to be about ?.??, as does Ireland (1997), while
Kim (2000) ﬁnds it to be 0.07.
On the supply side, across the output gap measures we ﬁnd that between 8 − 17
percent of ﬁrms re-optimize their price each period, implying a large degree of price
“stickiness.” The estimate of ξp declines to around 0.80 when the model is estimated
on the consumption gap variables. Galí and Gertler (1999, Table 1), estimate ξp
to be between 0.83 and 0.92 for the US, thus our estimates are consistent with their
ﬁndings.
Turning to the policy regime parameters, the implicit inﬂation target, π∗,i se s t i -
mated to be between 2.30 percent and 2.72 percent. The estimates of π∗ are slightly
lower when the model is estimated on GDP-price-index inﬂation than when estimated
on core-PCE inﬂation. With inﬂation measured using the GDP price index, Dennis
(2003) estimates π∗ to be 2.43 percent and Favero and Rovelli (2003) estimate it to
be 2.63 percent. For all ﬁve output/consumption gap variables, the relative weight
that the Federal Reserve places on output stabilization, λ, is small and statistically
insigniﬁcant. A wide range of values for λ have been obtained in the literature,
with estimates ranging between λ =0 .001 (Favero and Rovelli, 2003) and λ =4 .56
(Söderlind, 1999), but most estimates place λ between zero and one. The interest
rate smoothing parameter, ν,i ss i g n i ﬁcant for each gap variable, with the estimates
themselves ranging between 0.99 and 2.76. These point estimates are consistent
with the results in Dennis (2003), who gets ν =1 .95 (using b y1
t as the output gap),
and with the calibration results in Söderlind, Söderström, and Vredin (2002). In
addition, for each speciﬁcation c∗ is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, supporting
the view that Federal Reserve behavior did not generate a discretionary inﬂation bias
(Blinder, 1998).
When the model is estimated on the 3-month T-bill rate, the parameter estimates
are largely unaﬀected. However, two important diﬀerences are evident. First, while
the estimates of the implicit inﬂation target do not change much, the lower average
16value for the 3-month T-bill rate translates into a lower estimate of the rate of time
preference or, equivalently, into a higher estimate of the subjective discount factor.
Second, when the model is estimated on the 3-month T-bill rate, noticeably larger
estimates of ν, the relative weight policymakers place on interest rate smoothing, are
obtained.
4.2 Estimates with External Habit Formation
The previous subsection presented model estimates for the case where households
internalize the habit formation into their decision making. In this subsection, we
present estimates under the assumption that the habit formation is external. For this
exercise, the habit stock is assumed to depend on two lags of consumption, namely
Ht = γ1Ct−1 + γ2Ct−2, |γ1 + γ2| < 1, (19)
where equation (19) is motivated on the stylized fact that reduced-form equations for
the output gap typically depend on two lags of the output gap (King, Plosser, Stock,
and Watson, 1991; Galí, 1992). Expressing the habit formation according to equa-
tion (19), rather than according to the simpler speciﬁcation that has γ2 =0 ,l e a d st o
a system whose equilibrium relationships can contain two lags of the gap, placing the
model on a better footing to ﬁt the data. For this reason, if this two-lag speciﬁcation
for habit formation fails to describe the dynamics of output/consumption, then this
amounts to a more powerful strike against the New Keynesian optimal-policy appa-
ratus. Estimates of the model with external habit formation are presented in Table
3.
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ρ 4.26† 2.47 1.99 3.12†† 3.35‡
γ1 1.58†† 1.38†† 1.26†† 0.96†† 0.98††
γ2 -0.68†† -0.54†† -0.44‡ -0.08 -0.14
1
σ 0.05† 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
ξp 0.86†† 0.77†† 0.76†† 0.81†† 0.75††
π∗ 2.82‡ 2.27† 2.11 3.01†† 3.12††
c∗ 0.17 -0.07 -0.21 0.25 0.23
λ 0.15 0.88 0.75 0.00 0.61
ν 0.44‡ 0.79‡ 0.73‡ 3.36† 2.50†







ρ 3.61‡ 2.21 2.04 2.53†† 2.80‡
γ1 1.59†† 1.40†† 1.29†† 0.93†† 0.97††
γ2 -0.70†† -0.57†† -0.48‡ -0.05 -0.13
1
σ 0.05† 0.02† 0.02 0.03 0.01
ξp 0.85†† 0.75†† 0.74†† 0.82†† 0.75††
π∗ 2.84†† 2.30† 2.23 2.95†† 3.11††
c∗ 0.17 -0.05 -0.10 0.24 0.23
λ 0.17 1.04 1.21 0.00 0.00
ν 0.60‡ 1.02‡ 0.91‡ 4.97† 3.40†
†† indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level
‡ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level
† indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level
Table 3 shows that the second parameter in the external habit formation process,
γ2,i ss i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero only when the model is estimated on the output
gap variables. For these output-gap-based speciﬁcations, the negative sign on γ2
makes it natural to represent the habit formation process as
Ht =( γ1 + γ2)Ct−1 − γ2∆Ct−1, (20)
which implies that the marginal utility of consumption is declining in both the level
and the growth rate of last period’s consumption. However, if the dynamics in
equation (20) truly reﬂect habit formation, then we would expects a similar dynamic
structure to be present when the model is estimated on consumption data. Yet,
when the model is estimated on either b c1
t or b c2
t, γ2 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. The ﬁnding that γ2 is signiﬁcant in the output-based speciﬁcations, but not in
18the consumption-based speciﬁcations, suggests a problem with the underlying model,
whose resource constraint equates output to consumption. While the parameter
restriction — |γ1 + γ2| < 1 —i ss a t i s ﬁed for all speciﬁcations, the estimates point to
the fact that the dynamics of consumption and output are very diﬀerent.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ed i ﬀerences between the output-based and the consumption-
based estimates of γ1 and γ2 are systematic across the datasets implies that they are
not simply a consequence of the ﬁltering process used to de-trend output. Sev-
eral factors could account for the diﬀerences between the output-based and the
consumption-based estimates, but perhaps the most obvious candidate is investment
and the process of capital formation. Both the canonical New Keynesian model
and standard generalizations of the canonical model (such as those estimated here)
abstract from investment, partly as a simplifying device, but also on the basis that
the long-run eﬀects of capital formation can be put aside to analyze short-run macro-
economic stabilization issues. Problems with measuring the capital stock also make
it diﬃcult to estimate models that allow for capital accumulation. The results above
highlight the fact that abstracting from investment may mean that an important
mechanism through which shocks are propagated is omitted. If this is the case, then
the results in Dupor (2001), which emphasize that policy rules that satisfy the Tay-
lor principle produce indeterminacy in models with investment, suggest that ignoring
investment could have important implications for how monetary policy should be set.
Looking at the other parameter estimates, similar to the internal-habit-formation
speciﬁcations, with external habit formation the implicit inﬂation target is estimated
to be between 2.11 percent and 3.12 percent, the subjective discount factor is esti-
mated to be between 0.989 and 0.995, and the Calvo-pricing parameter is estimated
to be between 0.74 and 0.86. Larger point estimates of 1
σ are obtained from the
external habit formation speciﬁcations, but these estimates tend to be insigniﬁcant,
especially when the model is estimated on consumption data.
Turning to the other parameters in the policy objective function, the results are
similar to those obtained with internal habit formation. The relative weight on
interest rate smoothing is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but the weight on out-
put/consumption stabilization is insigniﬁcant and there is no evidence of a discre-
tionary inﬂation bias. While the point estimates of ν are, in general, smaller for
19the external-habit-formation model than for the internal-habit-formation model, as
found earlier, the weight placed on interest rate smoothing is larger when the model
i se s t i m a t e do nt h e3 - m o n t hT - b i l lt h a nw h e ni ti se s t i m a t e do nt h ef e d e r a lf u n d s
rate.
5 How well do the Models Fit the Data?
The estimates in Section 4 reveal both successes and failures with the New Key-
nesian optimal-policy apparatus. In particular, while all of the models’ parame-
ters have the correct sign, the estimates of β and the implicit inﬂation target are
very plausible, and a signiﬁcant weight on interest rate smoothing is found, 1
σ is
small and often statistically insigniﬁcant, the point estimates of γ,i nt h ei n t e r n a l -
habit-formation speciﬁcations, are greater than one for the output-based estimations,
and the relative weight policymakers place on output/consumption stabilization is
small and/or statistically insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, the ﬁnding that the properties
of the external-habit process diﬀer importantly between the output-based and the
consumption-based speciﬁcations — when the model’s resource constraint stipulates
equivalence — suggests that an important source of dynamics may be missing from the
model. As discussed above, since the omitted factor produces second-order dynamics
in the output-based speciﬁcations, but not in the consumption-based speciﬁcations,
a likely candidate for this omitted factor is investment. The fact that γ tends to be
slightly above one when the internal-habit-formation model is estimated on output
data, but comfortably below one when the model is estimated on consumption data,
lends further support to the view that some source of dynamics is omitted from the
output-based speciﬁcations.
Because the hybrid New Keynesian models are signiﬁcantly better empirically
than the canonical model, we now examine whether these hybrid New Keynesian
models provide an adequate description of US data. To assess their performance,
each speciﬁcation is compared to exactly identiﬁed VAR(1), VAR(2), and VAR(4)
processes. Three lag lengths are used when estimating the VARs because the equi-
librium of the internal-habit-formation model is nested within a VAR(1), the equi-
librium of the external-habit-formation model is nested within a VAR(2), and many
popular backward-looking models, such as the Rudebusch-Svensson model, are nested
20within a VAR(4). For each dataset, for each model, and for each VAR, the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1973), the Bayesian Schwarz criterion (Schwarz, 1978),
and the Hannan-Quinn criterion (Hannan and Quinn, 1979) are computed. For each
speciﬁcation, Table 4 presents the values of the three information criteria, relative to
the corresponding values from the three VARs. Values for the relative information
criteria that are less than one lend support for the theoretical models while values
greater than one support the unrestricted models over the theoretical models.
Table 4: Assessing the Models using (Relative) Information Criteria
VAR(1) VAR(2) VAR(4)





















t 1.08 1.04 1.06 1.14 1.02 1.08 1.23 0.95 1.09
b y1
t,R T
t 1.26 1.20 1.23 1.46 1.24 1.36 1.59 1.12 1.36
b y2
t,R T
t 1.24 1.17 1.21 1.39 1.18 1.29 1.56 1.09 1.32
b y3
t,R T
t 1.19 1.13 1.17 1.28 1.12 1.21 1.48 1.06 1.27
b c1
t,R T
t 1.10 1.06 1.09 1.24 1.08 1.17 1.42 1.03 1.23
b c2
t,R T





















t 1.08 1.05 1.07 1.14 1.03 1.09 1.23 0.96 1.10
b y1
t,R T
t 1.16 1.12 1.14 1.34 1.16 1.26 1.47 1.05 1.26
b y2
t,R T
t 1.15 1.10 1.13 1.28 1.11 1.21 1.44 1.03 1.23
b y3
t,R T
t 1.15 1.11 1.13 1.24 1.09 1.17 1.43 1.03 1.23
b c1
t,R T
t 1.12 1.08 1.10 1.25 1.10 1.18 1.43 1.05 1.24
b c2
t,R T
t 1.11 1.07 1.10 1.23 1.09 1.17 1.30 0.98 1.14
Table 4 shows that regardless of the VAR’s lag length, and regardless of the
particular information criterion used, the New Keynesian optimal-policy models do
not ﬁt the data as well as the VARs according to these information criteria. Only
when the models are compared to a VAR(4) process using the BIC criterion, which
places the largest penalty on parameter-number, are there any cases for which the
21relative information criteria are less than one. Thus, although the VARs are penalized
for containing a much larger number of parameters, they still tend to out-perform
the New Keynesian speciﬁcations.
Three other interesting results emerge from Table 4. First, on average, the
speciﬁcations with external habit formation perform better than those with internal
habit formation. This suggests that further development of New Keynesian models
might usefully employ external habit formation, especially for empirical applications.
Second, the New Keynesian models estimated on b y1
t perform the worst. This indi-
cates that the CBO measure of potential output may be introducing dynamics into
the output gap that can be accommodated within the VAR models, which have lots
of parameters, but not within more tightly parameterized theoretical speciﬁcations.
Looking at Figure 1A, it is clear that the characteristics of b y1
t are diﬀerent to those
of b y2
t or b y3
t; the results in Table 4 establish that these characteristics cannot easily be
accounted for within the conﬁnes of New Keynesian optimal-policy models. Thirdly,
estimating the models on b c2
t produces the best overall results in the sense that the
resulting speciﬁcations perform best relative to the VAR models. Since b c2
t is con-
structed by normalizing consumption with respect to the size of the labor force, this
implies that estimating New Keynesian models on consumption data and taking the
representative household assumption seriously may be important.
5.1 Impulse Response Functions
When assessed according to the three information criteria, the models performed
best when estimated on consumption per head, b c2
t, and on the federal funds rate,
R
f
t (but only marginally better than speciﬁcation estimated on RT
t ). To present
the best case for the New Keynesian optimal-policy framework we use the models




t and compare their impulse responses to those from the
VAR(4) model estimated on the same data. From this VAR model we also construct
95 percent conﬁdence bands about the VAR impulse responses. Notably, Table 4
indicates that the internal-habit-formation speciﬁcation performs slightly better than
the external-habit-formation speciﬁcation for this dataset.
Comparing the impulse response functions from the New Keynesian models to
those from the VAR helps to identify areas where the New Keynesian models fail
22to adequately reﬂect the data. For the VAR the impulse response functions are
generated for “supply”, “demand”, and “policy” shocks, using a recursive identiﬁca-
tion scheme with inﬂation ordered ﬁrst and the federal funds rate ordered last. It
is clear, however, that the New Keynesian optimal-policy models are not recursive.
Thus, to ensure that a valid comparison of the impulse response functions is made,
we identify the shocks in the New Keynesian models by placing the variables in the
same order as in the VAR and by imposing the same recursive identiﬁcation scheme.
To be speciﬁc, we take the time-consistent equilibrium of the New Keynesian models,
which can both be represented within









,w h e r est ∼ N [0,Ω],a n dw h e r eD0 has full rank, but
is not lower triangular. Premultiplying equation (21) by D−1
0 gives
pt = k + K1pt−1 + K2pt−2 + ωt, (22)













0 , where M
0−1
0 is an
upper triangular matrix constructed using a Choleski decomposition, then premulti-
plying equation (22) by M0 gives
M0zt = m + M1zt−1 + M2zt−2 + εt. (23)
Because M
0−1
0 is upper triangular, M0 is lower triangular, and equation (23) is in
the form of a recursively identiﬁed structural VAR. Transformed in this way the
impulse responses from the New Keynesian models can be compared to those from
the recursively identiﬁed VAR. Impulse response functions for shocks to the inﬂation
and consumption equations — “demand” and “supply” shocks — are shown in Figure
2.
Looking at the impulse responses from the VAR(4) process, following a one stan-
dard deviation demand shock consumption rises, inﬂation increases and monetary
policy is tightened. In response to higher interest rates, consumption and inﬂation
both begin to decline, eventually returning to baseline. For the supply shock, the
VAR reveals that inﬂation rises and that interest rates are raised in response. Higher
interest rates cause consumption to fall below baseline. With higher interest rates
23Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions
24and lower consumption, inﬂation begins to fall. As inﬂation falls, interest rates
decline and consumption begins to rise back to baseline.
Qualitatively, the impulse responses from the two New Keynesian models are sim-
ilar to those from the VAR model. In response to a one standard deviation demand
shock, consumption rises and the increase in consumer demand places pressure on
ﬁrms to increase prices. As an increasing number of ﬁrms raise their price, inﬂation
begins to rise and the central bank responds by tightening policy and increasing the
interest rate. For the internal-habit-formation model, the demand shock leads to a
r e l a t i v e l ym u t e di n t e r e s tr a t er e s p o n s eb e c a u s ep o l i c y m a k e r sp l a c el i t t l eo rn ow e i g h t
on consumption stabilization. For the external-habit-formation model, however, the
estimated weight on consumption stabilization leads to a rapid increase in interest
rates following the shock. By-and-large, the impulse responses from the internal-
habit-formation model and the external-habit-formation model are both similar to
those from the VAR(4), and they typically lie inside the VAR’s 95 percent conﬁdence
bands. However, both New Keynesian models have diﬃculty capturing the interest
rate’s response to the demand shock, with both model’s responses violating the 95
percent conﬁdence band.
Turning to the impulse responses for the supply shock, inﬂation rises following the
shock causing the central bank to raise the interest rate. The rise in interest rates
causes consumption to fall, with the associated drop in aggregate demand placing
downward pressure on inﬂation. When the impulse response functions from the two
New Keynesian models are compared to those from the VAR, it is clear that the
greatest discrepancies lie in how inﬂation evolves following the supply shock. The
assumption that non-optimizing ﬁrms index their price level to last period’s inﬂation
rate appears to make inﬂation excessively persistent. Because of this persistence
in inﬂation, the interest rate response to the supply shock for the external-habit-
formation speciﬁcation is also very large, far exceeding the VAR’s response.
For this particular dataset, the internal habit formation model and the exter-
nal habit formation model produce similar impulse responses, and these impulse
responses are often similar to those from the VAR(4) process. However, both New
Keynesian models have diﬃculty capturing how interest rates respond to shocks and
how inﬂation responds to supply shocks. Speciﬁcally, when compared to the VAR’s
25impulse responses, inﬂation is excessively persistent.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has examined whether the New Keynesian optimal-policy models that
are widely analyzed in the optimal monetary policy literature provide an empirically
adequate description of US economic outcomes for the Volcker-Greenspan period.
It is well known that the canonical New Keynesian model, while being analytically
tractable, has little empirical content and performs badly when assessed against ac-
tual outcomes. It is also well known that the central problem with the canonical
model is that it contains no endogenous dynamics, no mechanism to generate the per-
sistence observed in US data. For this reason, much of the optimal monetary policy
rules literature has moved away from the canonical model, turning instead to gen-
eralized, or hybrid, speciﬁcations in which inﬂation indexation and habit formation
introduce endogenous inﬂation and output/consumption dynamics.
I nt h i sp a p e rt w op o p u l a rh y b r i dN e wK e y n e s i a nm o d e l sa r ee s t i m a t e da n da n a -
lyzed to assess how well they ﬁt US data. Both models have Calvo-pricing and in-
ﬂation indexation by non-optimizing ﬁrms, but whereas one model has internal habit
formation the other has external habit formation. Both models are closed with the
assumption that monetary policy is set according to an optimal discretionary rule,
an assumption that allows the central bank’s implicit inﬂation target and the relative
weights assigned to target variables in the policy objective function to be identiﬁed
and estimated. These policy objective function parameters are estimated alongside
the behavioral parameters in the models. Several datasets are used for estimation
and the resulting parameter estimates are interpreted in light of the underlying theory
and in light of the existing empirical literature. To determine whether the models
provide an adequate description of US economic dynamics, and to establish the di-
mensions along which the models are deﬁcient, each model is assessed against several
VARs.
The key results that emerge from the analysis are as follows. First, the estimates
of the implicit inﬂation target and of the subjective discount factor are relatively
robust across models and across datasets. When inﬂation is measured using the GDP
chain-weighted price index, estimates of the implicit inﬂation target range between
262.11 percent and 2.84 percent; estimates using core-PCE price inﬂation vary between
2.69 percent and 3.12 percent. Estimates of the implicit inﬂation target are largely
unaﬀected by whether the instrument for monetary policy is the federal funds rate or
t h e3 - m o n t hT - b i l lr a t e . T h es u b j e c t i v ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ri se s t i m a t e dt ob eb e t w e e n
0.989 and 0.995, a range that is consistent with assumed values in quarterly models.
Second, we do not ﬁnd evidence that US policymakers have attempted to use mon-
etary policy to permanently boost output above the economy’s potential. For both
New Keynesian models, and for all datasets considered, estimates of the discretionary
inﬂation bias are small and/or statistically insigniﬁcant. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence
that policymakers smooth interest rates, but no evidence for an output/consumption
stabilization objective, both ﬁndings that are consistent with other studies. Larger
point estimates of the interest rate smoothing parameter are obtained when the mod-
els are estimated on consumption data and when the models are estimated on the
3-month T-bill rate.
Third, allowing for some form of habit formation signiﬁcantly improves the mod-
els’ ability to ﬁt the data. The estimates of the habit formation parameters are
highly signiﬁcant, implying that the standard time-separable utility function is too
rigid for empirical applications. Estimates of the internal-habit-formation parameter
are around one (but are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one) for output-based esti-
mations, but comfortably within for the consumption-based estimations. For the
external-habit-formation model we also ﬁnd important diﬀerences in the parameter
estimates depending on which dataset the model is estimated on. When the external-
habit-formation model is estimated on output data, two lags of output are statistically
signiﬁcant in the habit stock process. The coeﬃcient signs on these two lags imply
that the marginal utility of consumption is lowered by increases in both the level and
the growth rate of last period’s consumption. In contrast, when the model is esti-
mated on consumption data, only one lag of consumption is found to be signiﬁcant
in the habit stock process. These diﬀerences between the output-based estimates
and the consumption-based estimates across both the internal- and external-habit-
formation speciﬁcations suggest that some alternative source of dynamics may be at
work. A likely source for these dynamics is investment in physical capital, a vehicle
for savings that is abstracted from in most New Keynesian optimal-policy models.
27Fourth, estimates of the Calvo-pricing parameter, which determines the propor-
tion of ﬁrms that are able to re-optimize their price each period, indicate signiﬁcant
price “stickiness.” The point estimates of the Calvo-pricing parameter, which are
between 0.74 and 0.92 (indicating that between 8 percent and 26 percent of ﬁrms
reset their price each quarter), are consistent with other estimates. Greater price
ﬂexibility is evident for the external-habit-formation speciﬁcations. Fifth, according
to standard information criteria, the New Keynesian models do not ﬁtt h ed a t aa s
well as exactly identiﬁed VAR processes do. However, speciﬁcations that are esti-
mated on consumption data perform better than those estimated on output data; an
intriguing result given that most New Keynesian models are applied and interpreted
in terms of output gap speciﬁcations. Focusing on the dataset for which the models
perform best, when the impulse response functions from the New Keynesian models
are compared to those from a VAR(4) model it is apparent that both New Keynesian
models have diﬃculty capturing the economy’s response to supply shocks and how in-
terest rates respond to either demand or supply shocks. Importantly, looking across
the diﬀerent estimations, the external-habit-formation model appears to ﬁt the data
slightly better than the internal-habit-formation model. This result suggests that
developing the New Keynesian optimal-policy model by building on external habit
formation, rather than on internal habit formation, may be the more promising way
forward.
Overall, while the hybrid New Keynesian models estimated in this paper do oﬀer a
statistically signiﬁcant improvement over the canonical model, they are still deﬁcient
in several important respects, and are outperformed by VAR models, even when
the VAR models are penalized for being over-parameterized. Better results are
achieved when the models are estimated on consumption data and when external
habit formation is employed. However, the absence of investment from the New
Keynesian optimal-policy model appears to be a serious shortcoming, particularly
because the design of optimal policy rules can hinge importantly on whether or not
capital formation takes place. Adding investment and allowing capital to be a
productive input is an important area for future work.
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